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INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE ON THE
ROBB ELEMENTARY SHOOTING
TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
INTERIM REPORT 2022

INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE ON THE
ROBB ELEMENTARY SHOOTING
TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
INTERIM REPORT 2022

INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE ON THE
ROBB ELEMENTARY SHOOTING
TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
INTERIM REPORT 2022

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INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE ON THE
ROBB ELEMENTARY SHOOTING
TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
INTERIM REPORT 2022
Rep. Dustin Burrows
Chair
Rep. Joe Moody
Vice-Chair
Hon. Eva Guzman
Public Member

Because of these failures of facilities maintenance and advance preparation, the attacker fired
most of his shots and likely murdered most of his innocent victims before any responder set
foot in the building. Of the approximately 142 rounds the attacker fired inside the building, it
is almost certain that he rapidly fired over 100 of those rounds before any officer entered.
The Responders
Since the 1999 Columbine tragedy, the law enforcement community has recognized the critical
importance of implementing active shooter training for all officers, regardless of specialty.
Also, all officers must now acknowledge that stopping the killing of innocent lives is the
highest priority in active shooter response, and all officers must be willing to risk their lives
without hesitation.
At Robb Elementary, law enforcement responders failed to adhere to their active shooter
training, and they failed to prioritize saving the lives of innocent victims over their own safety.
The first wave of responders to arrive included the chief of the school district police and the
commander of the Uvalde Police Department SWAT team. Despite the immediate presence
of local law enforcement leaders, there was an unacceptably long period of time before
officers breached the classroom, neutralized the attacker, and began rescue efforts. We do not
know at this time whether responders could have saved more lives by shortening that delay.
Regardless, law enforcement committed numerous mistakes in violation of current active
shooter training, and there are important lessons to be learned from each faulty assumption
and poor decision made that day.
The Uvalde CISD’s written active shooter plan directed its police chief to assume command
and control of the response to an active shooter. The chief of police was one of the first
responders on the scene. But as events unfolded, he failed to perform or to transfer to another
person the role of incident commander. This was an essential duty he had assigned to himself
in the plan mentioned above, yet it was not effectively performed by anyone. The void of
leadership could have contributed to the loss of life as injured victims waited over an hour for
help, and the attacker continued to sporadically fire his weapon.
A command post could have transformed chaos into order, including the deliberate
assignment of tasks and the flow of the information necessary to inform critical decision
making. Notably, nobody ensured that responders making key decisions inside the building
received information that students and teachers had survived the initial burst of gunfire, were
trapped in Rooms 111 and 112, and had called out for help. Some responders outside and
inside the building knew that information through radio communications. But nobody in

command analyzed this information to recognize that the attacker was preventing critically
injured victims from obtaining medical care. Instead of continuing to act as if they were
addressing a barricaded subject scenario in which responders had time on their side, they
should have reassessed the scenario as one involving an active shooter. Correcting this error
should have sparked greater urgency to immediately breach the classroom by any possible
means, to subdue the attacker, and to deliver immediate aid to surviving victims. Recognition
of an active shooter scenario also should have prompted responders to prioritize the rescue
of innocent victims over the precious time wasted in a search for door keys and shields to
enhance the safety of law enforcement responders.
An effective incident commander located away from the drama unfolding inside the building
would have realized that radios were mostly ineffective, and that responders needed other lines
of communication to communicate important information like the victims’ phone calls from
inside the classrooms. An offsite overall incident commander likely could have located a master
key more quickly—several people on campus had one. An offsite overall incident commander
may have suggested checking to see if officers could open the door without a key—in
hindsight, they probably could have. An offsite overall incident commander who properly
categorized the crisis as an active shooter scenario should have urged using other secondary
means to breach the classroom, such as using a sledgehammer as suggested in active shooter
training or entering through the exterior windows.
Uvalde CISD and its police department failed to implement their active shooter plan and failed
to exercise command and control of law enforcement responding to the tragedy. But these
local officials were not the only ones expected to supply the leadership needed during this
tragedy.
Hundreds of responders from numerous law enforcement agencies—many of whom were
better trained and better equipped than the school district police—quickly arrived on the
scene. Those other responders, who also had received training on active shooter response and
the interrelation of law enforcement agencies, could have helped to address the unfolding
chaos.
Yet in this crisis, no responder seized the initiative to establish an incident command post.
Despite an obvious atmosphere of chaos, the ranking officers of other responding agencies
did not approach the Uvalde CISD chief of police or anyone else perceived to be in command
to point out the lack of and need for a command post, or to offer that specific assistance.
Several will suggest they were misled by false or misleading information they received as they
arrived; however, the “chaos” described by almost all of them demonstrates that at a

minimum, responders should have asked more questions. This suggests a training deficiency,
in that responding officers failed to adequately question the absence of command. Other
responders failed to be sufficiently assertive by identifying the incident commander and
offering their assistance or guidance, or by assuming command in the absence of any other
responder having expressly done so. In this sense, the entirety of law enforcement and its
training, preparation, and response shares systemic responsibility for many missed
opportunities on that tragic day.